IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION

JAMES D. JOHNSON, AS NEXT FRIEND TO OLIVIA Y, ET AL.

PLAINTIFFS

VS.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:04CV251-TSL-FKB

GOVERNOR PHIL BRYANT, ET AL.

DEFENDANTS

MOTION HEARING

BEFORE THE HONORABLE F. KEITH BALL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE AUGUST 24TH, 2018 JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFFS: MS. MARCIA R. LOWRY

MR. MICHAEL J. BENTLEY

FOR THE DEFENDANTS: MR. JAMES L. JONES

MS. KENYA KEY RACHAL

REPORTED BY: MARY VIRGINIA "Gina" MORRIS, RMR, CRR

501 East Court Street, Suite 2.500 Jackson, Mississippi 39201

(601) 608-4187

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THE COURT: You can be seated. All right.
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             Clay, we do have someone on the phone?
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             IT TECHNICIAN: Correct?
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             THE COURT: The court calls the case of Olivia Y, et
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    al. v. Phil Bryant, et al. This is civil action number
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    3:04cv251. I will first have counsel identify themselves for
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    the record as well as the parties on whose behalf you're
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    appearing, starting with plaintiffs' counsel.
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             MS. LOWRY: Marcia Lowry for -- counsel for
    plaintiffs, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: All right.
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             MR. BENTLEY: And Michael Bentley, also counsel for
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    plaintiffs.
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             THE COURT: Okay. Defense counsel?
             MR. JONES: Your Honor, I'm James L. "Larry" Jones,
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    counsel for the defendant.
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             THE COURT: All right.
             MS. RACHAL: And I'm Kenya Key Rachal, counsel for
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    defendants.
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             THE COURT: All right. Mr. Dickinson, you're also
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    here with us. So if you'll go ahead and just identify yourself
    for the record.
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             MR. DICKINSON: Thank you, Your Honor.
    Dickinson, commissioner for the department.
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             THE COURT: Thank you. Appreciate you being here in
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person. Thank you.

It's my understanding we also have someone on the phone with us. If you will identify yourself for the record, please.

MS. TAYLOR: Yes. This is Lisa Alexander Taylor from Public Catalyst, and I'm one of the monitors.

THE COURT: All right. I appreciate you appearing as well. And do you -- can you hear me fine? You came -- you came through loud and clear, but can you hear me okay?

MS. TAYLOR: Yes, I can. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

This matter is before the court on the plaintiffs' motion for scheduling conference and for amended case management order permitting limited discovery and response to defendants' objections to plaintiffs' proposed discovery. That motion is document 768 on the docket of this court.

It is essentially in conjunction with or in response to the defendants' motion for relief under Section 11.2(a) of the Second Modified Settlement Agreement and Reform Plan and Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Long titles, but that's what they are. And that's document 756 on the docket of this court.

Let me go ahead and just kind of give a summary of where we are, and then I'll give both sides an opportunity to address some of the issues. I think I can short-circuit some

of it, but let me at least couch why we're here for purposes of the record.

The defendants had filed a motion that I've already referenced that is essentially requesting relief from the Second Modified Settlement Agreement and Reform Plan specifically dealing with a request for relief from the 90 percent caseworker caseload requirement in that second MSA. And they also request an evidentiary hearing before the district judge in this case, Tom Lee.

Essentially, the defendants are asserting in the motion that they have made all reasonable efforts to comply with the 90 percent caseload metric, also that they have fulfilled their obligations to seek sufficient funding from the Mississippi Legislature. And they're also requesting equitable relief, specifically a directive from the district judge to develop a plan to achieve a reasonable level of caseload compliance, as it's phrased in the motion.

The plaintiffs, although they have already responded to that motion, are requesting an opportunity to conduct some discovery relevant to some of those issues and requesting an opportunity to make — to file a supplemental response to the motion. And, as I understand it, plaintiffs' counsel have already propounded some discovery. Is that right?

MS. LOWRY: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Defendants have objected to

that discovery and essentially are taking the position that no discovery should be permitted prior to a ruling by the court on the motion that they have filed seeking relief from the MSA.

Is that -- am I accurately stating defendants' position? In a nutshell, y'all are objecting to any discovery before the evidentiary hearing or a ruling from the court.

MR. JONES: Your Honor, that -- we stated that position, but we immediately also set forth that if -- that's discretionary. We assumed the court would consider discovery and we do recommend certain limits with regard to that discovery.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. JONES: So we were not hard and fast on no discovery; but for reasons I'll address in our presentation to the court, we think the discovery should be very limited. It's a very narrow issue in the 60(b) motion related to the inability to comply with this metric as a result of over a \$50 million deficit in fiscal year 2018 and \$23 million less in requested funding for fiscal year 2019. Those are essentially facts that are discovered from documents.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Well, I'm going to take all the suspense out of the motion and go ahead and say I've been in contact with Judge Lee's office. So this isn't really coming just from me, but Judge Lee wants there to be discovery. So the purpose of our conference today and the purpose of this

hearing is, I'll go ahead and say, the plaintiffs' motion is going to be granted as far as a modification — whether you want to call it a modification of the case management order or whether it is just a scheduling order that we need to put into place as to the amount of time that we're going to allow for discovery, the scope of that discovery, and then, obviously, coming up with a briefing schedule after the discovery.

Judge Lee has -- I believe Judge Lee has every intention of having an evidentiary hearing after everything is briefed up. And Judge Lee wants to have all of the relevant information before him that is essential and necessary for him to make an -- to make an informed decision.

So with that being said, I really don't want to hear argument from counsel. The main reason I wanted everyone to be here is we need to just -- we need to address those issues, how long would this -- and maybe the first topic is what's the scope of the discovery going to be; two, once we can -- and I would love for us to be able to reach an agreement on that and that y'all don't force me to have to rule on it. So I first want to just talk about whether we can reach an agreement on what the scope of discovery would be. If we can't, then I'll make a decision and I'll go ahead and make a decision today.

Two, we need to come up with the time period that would be necessary to complete that discovery; and, obviously, the scope will impact that. So we'll deal with the scope

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(PAUSE)

first, then the timing, and then we'll talk about a briefing schedule. Let me -- Mr. Jones has already made a little bit of argument with respect to what they believe the scope of discovery ought to be. So let me turn it over to plaintiffs' counsel and we'll give you an opportunity to make whatever argument you wish to make or just to share with the court what you believe would be the necessary scope of discovery. MS. LOWRY: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Yes. MS. LOWRY: Your Honor, this issue does not arise out of events of the last two years. This case has been in a monitoring perspective for eight years. Defendants have never complied with the obligations that are set out in a settlement agreement to which they have agreed. The situation, frankly, is very dire. Children have died. Children continue to be neglected in foster homes because there are not enough workers to visit the foster homes. When we filed this most recent -- and this is the second contempt motion. When we filed this contempt motion --THE COURT: Could you pause for just a second.

23 THE COURT: All right. You may proceed. Go ahead.

the second contempt motion that has been filed in this case.

MS. LOWRY: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. So this is

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And each time -- when we had the first -- and we have gone to very, very great lengths to avoid the filing of contempt motions. Because the state has never been in compliance with this settlement agreement, there have been always multiple grounds on which to seek a contempt motion; but we have tried to work with the state over these eight years to try to resolve the situation. And there have been many, many efforts.

And I think it's important for the court to know that this is not something that has only recently arisen and that when we seek a motion for contempt, as we have earlier this year, that is because we really are at our wits' end with regard to trying to get compliance with the agreement.

The monitoring has changed in this case. A monitor who was a very, very conscientious and rigorous monitor issued numerous reports, all of which showed the defendants were out of compliance with this agreement and documented all of the issues on which they were deficient.

More than two years ago we entered into a different process; and we brought in an organization that the defendants were very, very happy with to provide the technical assistance to the agency, because agencies do not automatically come into compliance with agreements. It's work.

THE COURT: Hang -- I hate to interrupt you.

MS. LOWRY: That's okay.

THE COURT: But when I used the phrase before "I want

to kind of cut to the chase" --1 2 MS. LOWRY: Okav. 3 THE COURT: -- I really -- it's really not that 4 beneficial to me to hear all of the background information. 5 Some of it I'm already aware of; but, more importantly, I'm a 6 little bit limited on time today. 7 MS. LOWRY: Okay. 8 THE COURT: What I would like to do is let's go ahead 9 and get directly to the issue of what discovery -- given the motion that the defendants have filed seeking relief from the 10 agreement, what issues do you believe you need to conduct 11 12 discovery on in order to more fully respond to the defendants' 13 motion and to be prepared for the evidentiary hearing that 14 Judge Lee is going to hold? 15 MS. LOWRY: Thank you, Your Honor. I will do that. 16 THE COURT: All right. 17 MS. LOWRY: What we think is relevant here is to 18 understand whether these are unforeseen circumstances and 19 whether this could have reasonably been expected or not with 20 regard to the funding issue that was before the legislature. 21 Defendants have portrayed this as an extraordinary event and a 22 fiscal crisis. I do want to put quotes around that. 23 We don't think it's a fiscal crisis. We think this is a crisis that -- it is a crisis, but that has continued for 24 25 eight years. I don't think that's a crisis. I don't think

that meets the parameters of what 60(b)(5) allows. And what's more, there's an explicit provision that prohibits defendants from seeking relief from the judgment until 2020.

So what we want is discovery on what the funding has been over the last five years, what efforts have been made and where else the money could come from and exactly what the scope of the shortfall is. In fact, although the defendants say they've put in a lot of information, frankly, we tried to figure out what the information showed and we can't. And we --

THE COURT: Do you believe that the written discovery that you've already propounded captures all of the issues that you believe discovery is necessary on?

MS. LOWRY: We think the discovery is in two phases, one, the written discovery we have propounded. And, yes, Your Honor, we do believe that it covers all the issues. Secondly, we want to take depositions. And we have asked in the discovery for who are the people who have knowledge of these issues.

So the discovery is all related, but -- and we think the discovery is sufficient except we want to take depositions of the people who are identified. Basically, that's it.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Let me hear from Mr. Jones, and what objection would you have or -- let me hear -- if this court was just to say, Okay. I'm going to allow them to propound this discovery and to take depositions

as to those that may have personal knowledge of those discovery responses and the issues that are addressed in that discovery, what objection would you have to that, Mr. Jones?

MR. JONES: Can I come to the podium?

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honor. First of all -- and I'll do this very briefly -- the discovery is related to the 60(b) motion that's before the court. The 60(b) motion seeks two things. One is relief from a 90 percent caseload compliance requirement that is in two agreements, both of which were entered by this court as consent orders.

And it's interestingly — interesting and very critically legally important, those orders were entered in institutional reform litigation which sets up a very specific standard of review for the court in reviewing a request for modification. But the modification request is only relief from one requirement, that is, a 90 percent caseworker caseload requirement, and an additional request that the court direct the defendants, including the primary client, the department of protection services, to work with the court monitor to develop a plan to achieve compliance in the future.

Now, based on the failure to meet that requirement, the plaintiffs have essentially requested that this court find this department in contempt and then place the department in a receivership of undefined scope for an undefined period at

extraordinary unbudgeted costs. So this 60(b) motion is critically important, but it is very limited.

And the discovery should be limited not, as plaintiffs' counsel with whom I respectfully disagree on many points, but I'm not going to belabor those today — it has to be limited to the scope of the motion itself that's before the court for 60(b) relief of a consent order entered in this institutional reform litigation.

And that motion sets forth that the reason the

department was unable to achieve this metric was because of two things. And keep in mind that in — if you'd note this date, I think it's very important for all of us to consider. Commissioner Dickinson, former Justice Dickinson, one of the leading jurists and citizens in our state, became the commissioner of this department on September 18th of 1977 (sic). The 90 percent metric deadline did not become a firm

requirement until December 1 of 2017.

Now, what Justice Dickinson immediately experienced in one of the most complex departments in this state to run and manage was there was a looming financial deficit that was going to mean — and I may be off a month or two, but in early 2018 with the fiscal year ending June 30 of 2018, the department was experiencing what was projected initially as over a \$50 million deficit. In other words, the department was not going to be able to pay its bills and was going to run out of money in

March or April of 2018. That fiscal crisis was resolved. That is the first basis for the changed circumstances in the 60(b) motion.

The second basis is equally specific. That basis is in that same general time period the department was applying to the state legislature for appropriations necessary to fund its operations including the requirements under the consent orders that had been entered. It was necessary under

Judge Dickinson's leadership to amend the request for appropriation and to seek approximately \$133 million which the legislature was told would be necessary to meet operations even after budget cuts and other fiscal steps were taken to address the deficit. Instead of \$133 million, the legislature after balancing all of the demands that the legislature faces in the fiscal arena awarded \$23 million less.

THE COURT: All right. I hate to do it, but I have to do the same thing that I did to plaintiffs' counsel.

MR. JONES: I'm sorry if I got carried away.

THE COURT: I understand -- well, and I understand that lawyers always kind of want to get to the main part of their case and make the point. I have to deal with some issues that are often very boring and tedious. And the one that I've got to deal with today is am I going to -- Judge Lee has already indicated he wants some discovery conducted because he wants to be fully informed. So I'm going to allow it. So my

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job is to figure out the best way to proceed on that. And --MR. JONES: Let me ask you a question. THE COURT: -- I'll go ahead and tell you. I'm inclined to just grant the plaintiffs' motion, allow them to propound the written discovery that they -- to enter an order that they are allowed to propound the written discovery that's previously been propounded and to take the depositions that -of those that have personal knowledge of the responses.

So my main purpose at this point in the hearing in turning to you is do you have -- is to gather from you whether you have particular objections to these interrogatories and requests for production or that you believe that they are too broad. And if so, tell me specifically what you believe is too broad and why.

MR. JONES: All right. First of all, they're too broad in the temporal time period. They range -- and I could go through them one by one, but they range from July -- I'm sorry -- for fiscal year 2016 to the present. Fiscal year 2016 began on June 30 of 2015.

So, consequently, fiscal year 2016 is irrelevant. Justice Dickinson was not there. This financial crisis was not present. The 90 percent metric was not even in place as a requirement until December 31st of 2017. So fiscal year 2016 is irrelevant. Fiscal year 2017 is also irrelevant. That fiscal year ended on July -- on June 30 of 2017.

What is in play here is fiscal year 2018 and fiscal year 2019. That is the period which the budget crisis arose and that is what we're basing our 60(b) motion on. So, consequently, the first limitation needs to be, in my humble opinion, for restriction of the temporal period to fiscal years 2018 and 2019.

Now, the other limitation that I would urge the court would be when you review the -- there's a first set of -- first request for production, second request for production, and first set of interrogatories. There -- parts of those requests are unduly burdensome and overbroad because they seek, in essence -- I could refer you to point by point, but I think I'd like to do it generally. They seek in essence witnesses, disclosures, documents about not only available funds but potentially available funds and -- and the specific use of available funds.

Well, in the Department of Child Protection Services, funding is a moving target. Funds are allocated to the department pursuant to a budget. That budget is constantly — the operational budget is constantly moving as there are needs, as there are crises, as there are additional demands, as additional programs come off and online, as contracts end. So the discovery should be limited to the questions in the 60(b) motion. Was there a financial crisis in fiscal year 2018 and what efforts were made to secure funding in fiscal year 2019?

That is largely a documentary production. With those two limits and some restriction as to telling us exactly how funds were used when that's not the question, I think that the discovery that's been tendered could be workable. There are some questions which relate to the --

THE COURT: Let me stop you right there. You said some of them -- the way I'm interpreting the last point that you were making --

MR. JONES: Right.

THE COURT: -- is that the wording of some of those interrogatories and requests for production would be -- would be so broad that they would be unduly burdensome and the -- you know. You've practiced law for a long time. You've had to craft discovery responses; and often you end up propounding discovery responses that may be too broad, but the responding party can in good faith provide certain information subject to that objection that it is -- the wording of it is overly broad and it's unduly burdensome.

And then the responding party will usually provide information that is responsive to that discovery request that isn't too -- that is clearly what -- the main part of what the requesting party is seeking. Could you --

MR. JONES: I don't want --

THE COURT: I don't want to get down into details of trying to word discovery responses today. If I were to allow

the plaintiff to propound the discovery that has been previously propounded, you would — the responding party, the defendants in this case — I mean the defendants in this case would have available to them those types of objections. And so — and I know I may find myself in another discovery hearing as a result, but I don't know any better way to do it.

I'm hoping that maybe the parties could work together and possibly reach agreements as to whether the information that is provided in the documents, that are provided are sufficiently responsive that you don't have to bring a discovery dispute to me. But I do want to make it clear that in the event that I issue an order that the plaintiff is allowed to propound the previously propounded discovery and depose those that maybe have personal knowledge of those responses, that it will still be available to the parties to make those types of objections.

MR. JONES: Your Honor, and that is why I did not go document -- I mean request by request.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. JONES: We're perfectly fine with that. We will respond in good faith. I have the greatest respect for Ms. Lowry and the work she does. We all tender discovery requests that sometimes have language that's been around a long time --

THE COURT: Whether it's in the request or in the

response. I agree.

MR. JONES: But I think the issues are fairly narrow in the 60(b) motion. We will push out documents. But I think the court understands in an agency of the nature of what we have, the discovery needs to be limited so that we -- it does not disrupt the necessary management functions and operations of this agency.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. JONES: And that would be my suggestion. We can in good faith respond and, hopefully, work out any difficulties. We will produce documents that show why we believe there was a crisis. There's really no dispute about that. There was a \$12 million state appropriation and over 40 -- over \$30 million that ultimately was transferred to the department from DHS. And the allocat -- the appropriation in 2019 is a matter of public record.

THE COURT: All right. Ms. Lowry, let me hear from you on the possibility of limiting the time period to the fiscal years 2018 and '19.

MS. LOWRY: Your Honor, we don't accept a basic premise here that the defendants are operating under. We have a settlement agreement that requires the states to do specific things, and it is not dependent on appropriations. So whether the legislature appropriated the money or not -- and we do think there's a big question about how the budget got worked

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out -- we think it's also important to know how the money has
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    been appropriated previously, because the governor's a
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    defendant here and the state has been obligated and in the
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    settlement agreement it says the state is obligated to produce
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    the results in the settlement agreement. And the legislature
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    doesn't appropriate specific positions, and there are more
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    things going on with regard to the defendants' noncompliance
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    than just this issue.
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             So we don't think it should be limited to 2018,
    because if the legislature has ever appropriated money
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    specifically to comply with this agreement, it is sort of news
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    to us. And we don't think that the state can be limited to
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    what the legislature specifically appropriates for specific
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    things.
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             THE COURT: All right. And you're asking for fiscal
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    years -- your discovery would be for fiscal years what?
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             MS. LOWRY: Your Honor, it's for the past five fiscal
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    years.
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             THE COURT: All right. What I was going to ask you is
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    you do agree -- or correct me if I'm wrong -- that the only
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    provision that they are seeking relief from is the 90 percent
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    caseload requirement. Correct?
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             MS. LOWRY: Yes, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: And I thought Mr. Jones did a good job of
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succinctly saying that's the only issue in the motion.

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MS. LOWRY: That's right.

THE COURT: So why should you go back -- and he represented to the court and I wanted to ask you that that was a provision that was not added until 2017. Is that true?

MS. LOWRY: No.

THE COURT: -- or false?

MS. LOWRY: That's not true, Your Honor. There have always been caseload limits in the agreements, and there have always been obligations to comply with caseload limits.

THE COURT: All right. Did the percentage change? What change would he be referring to in 2017?

MS. LOWRY: I think what -- what happened in 2017 was that the state for the first time in the history of this case became serious about trying to comply with the agreement and brought in a monitoring group that also was very specific. And the monitoring group said, Before you do anything else, you have to get your caseloads under control.

And the caseloads have never been under control. And, frankly, Your Honor, I don't as I stand here today remember what percentages were previously in the agreement, but this was an -- this was a number that was arrived at by the monitoring group after they did research on what the caseloads actually were. And that kind of research had never been done before because it was almost unfathomable to try to figure out what they were.

THE COURT: Okay. 1 2 MS. LOWRY: So this was a real effort to look at it. 3 THE COURT: My concern is that if they're -- if 4 they're doing -- I don't know how much time would be required 5 for them to provide the information you're requesting for one 6 fiscal year. I don't know if that is a major endeavor for them 7 to do that. If it is, you know, I don't know -- but if it is, 8 then it would be, obviously, exponentially more the more years 9 I add and the more years I allow. I don't know. 10 Could you give me a little bit more idea of exactly what it is that you're requesting that just using common sense 11 12 you can envision that it is going to take them some time to 13 get? Can you give me some more details on exactly what I'm 14 talking about --15 MS. LOWRY: Certainly. THE COURT: -- I'm dealing with? 16 17 MS. LOWRY: You know, one thing that the state has said that is absolutely right is that the budget is constantly 18 19 moving. And that is what, in fact, happened. So there is no 20 really fixed budget. There's a lot of interaction among the 21 agencies. And it is our position that more money has gone into 22 the agency in previous years than has been proposed to go into 23 it over this next year. And that's why it is important to try 24 to track this back. 25 Your Honor, I think insofar as records exist, they are

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very limited in scope, and this will not be a burdensome effort to produce them. Your Honor, we -- we want to get this issue to the court, and we want the court to have the information the court needs. We have no interest at all in the defendants spending months and months producing discovery. We want this as efficiently and as quickly as possible. If it doesn't exist, it doesn't exist; and they can tell us that. That's fine. But we do think it's necessary to have the five-year history here. THE COURT: What if I gave you three? MS. LOWRY: We'll take three, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. MR. JONES: Can I say something from here? THE COURT: Absolutely. And if both of you -- now that we're kind of going back and forth and we may go a little bit more back and forth, if y'all want to be at counsel table, that's fine with me. MR. JONES: I can say it from here because I know the court is busy and wants to move on. You don't need to move. The first point, I want to make this very clear. The United States Supreme Court as early as in the Rufo case, which was in the '90s as I recall and I believe it's in -- on page 392 of this case, has said that in a 60(b) motion to change a consent order in an institutional reform case, financial

constraints are relevant.

It was stated that that is not the case. That is absolutely incorrect. And that is the basis legally for the 60(b) motion before the court.

But in terms of the scope of discovery, we're dealing with the two grounds in the 60(b) motion that we're only asking the court for relief for, and that is the 2018 financial crisis and the 2019 appropriation. We're not putting on other defenses. And it is very burdensome — if the court would like, I have the discovery here to say — to look at these discovery requests as anything other than extremely demanding to the department.

It's for an entire fiscal year: Give information, documents and witnesses who can testify about all available resources, all potential resources, all uses of the moneys you received. That's how the discovery is phrased. And that is extremely burdensome going back five years with many people who were involved in this agency no longer being in place.

And we are dealing with the crises faced by

Justice Dickinson after he arrived on September 18 of 2017. So

fiscal years '18 and '19 in my opinion are critically important
as limitations. If the court is going to push us to '17, I

think it's going to put a lot of demands on us. But to go back
to fiscal year '16 or even before -- one of the questions asked

for documents about any deficit ever suffered by the

department. I don't know what the time limitation on that is, but that's the request. So we would urge you to bring this to a head in a way that the court can make a decision on what the 60(b) motion states.

THE COURT: I hear you. At the same time I think that there may be some -- there's already been some argument made that, as I'm understanding it, but may -- some of these issues may deal with -- since this has been in place for a long time, whether you had -- some of what the department may have done in the past maybe had created the case that existed later and that some of the things -- and I hear you with respect to when Justice Dickinson started, but the issue is not just what has happened since he's been in charge but what has happened prior to him being in charge. And that -- some of that may be relevant.

Now, what I am concerned about is creating -- putting a burden on the department that is unreasonable under the circumstances. And I would like to limit it in such a way that it will -- I'm weighing and trying to balance between not putting an unreasonable burden on them and providing plaintiffs with the information they need. And I'm trying to strike a balance there. Yes, sir. Go ahead.

MR. JONES: As a young boy, they would sometimes let me ask a question if I raised my hand. Can I show you one thing, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Absolutely. 1 2 MR. JONES: Your Honor, the requirement we are seeking 3 relief from was not in place as a requirement until December 31 of 2017. 4 5 MS. LOWRY: No, Your Honor, we agree with that. 6 agree with that. There have been previous caseload 7 limitations. 8 THE COURT: Yes. Okay. 9 MR. JONES: This is simply a page from the STRO. (DOCUMENT TENDERED TO THE COURT) 10 MR. JONES: And so, consequently, the -- that is the 11 only deadline metric we are seeking relief from. And I will 12 13 say this on the record and represent this absolutely to you. 14 This case started in 2004, 14 years ago. If it goes another 14 15 years, I probably will not be standing here. But there has 16 never been compliance with a 90 percent standard in the history 17 of this agency. This is a brand-new metric. No one, not the former 18 19 commissioner, not the commissioners in the past, not the range

This is a brand-new metric. No one, not the former commissioner, not the commissioners in the past, not the range of governors, has ever met this standard. And there are reasons we want to present why we didn't meet it the first time it was required. It is just simply not true that there were other deadlines of 90 percent at any time in the past. Perhaps it would have been relevant if there were. There were not. That is the deadline.

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THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Lowry, any response to that?

MS. LOWRY: Your Honor, there -- this is the third settlement agreement in this case. Each one has had some variation. Each one has had caseload limits. The 90 percent metric was the one that was entered most recently. There have been previous requirements. The State has -- and he is correct; the State has never complied with any of them. So we stand on that.

But we do need some previous years. And if the court wants to limit us to three years, we can live with that. But the state has never complied with anything in this case. And last year they had a year off from any monitoring to give them the time to build capacity. They promised us they would get to this particular metric in '18. They have not.

And this is only the beginning. And I don't want to go into the details, Your Honor. I know the time is limited here. But we do need some earlier year budget information.

And if the court wants to give us three years, we will accept that.

THE COURT: All right. I'm a big fan and have tried to consistently rule definitely on things and move it off my desk and able to move on to something else. Sometimes I find myself in a situation where maybe I should do it in phases, and I'm going to do it here.

What I'm going to do is grant the plaintiffs' motion

and specifically order that the plaintiffs may propound the discovery set out in Exhibit A to their motion and conduct depositions of witnesses identified in said discovery. That's the way it's worded in your motion. Maybe I'm creating a problem where one doesn't exist, but there may be -- I'm going to grant the way it's worded in your motion.

I also realize there may be someone that's not specifically identified in that discovery that you may based on discovery responses or other information believe they need to be deposed, and I'm not shutting the door on that. But I'm going to grant -- my order is going to be worded the way that your motion is. And if you wish to take any depositions of anyone that's not identified in discovery, then you'll need to file a motion. So -- but that's going to be the order of the court, that the plaintiffs may propound the discovery set out in Exhibit A and conduct depositions of witnesses identified in that -- in said discovery.

I am going to limit it initially in my order to fiscal years 2018 and '19. If after getting that information you wish to request additional years, bring that to me. And the reason I didn't say file a motion is in my typical case management order when there are discovery disputes, I first have a telephone conference with the parties to see if we can work it out.

So if you wish to go -- if you wish to go back further

than those two fiscal years, call my chambers. Let's all get on the phone and let's see if we can work it out and reach some kind of compromise. It may be some subset of the information that you've previously gotten that you could get for those other fiscal years. And I can think of other ways that we may be able to resolve it.

But just to avoid the risk of placing an unreasonable burden on the department, I am going to limit it -- my order is going to limit it to fiscal years 2018 and '19, but I'm not completely closing the door on you getting other information about previous fiscal years.

I will also -- after you go through this process, both parties will have a better feel for how time-consuming and how burdensome it was to get -- to produce the information that you requested.

I want to hear from both of you on -- I need to set a deadline for the completion of discovery. How long do you think it would take, Ms. Lowry?

MS. LOWRY: Your Honor, the defendants have --

THE COURT: And maybe I should be asking that of defense counsel to start with, but --

MS. LOWRY: All right. Your Honor, defendants have had these interrogatories since June 27th.

THE COURT: Yes, but if they operated like most lawyers operate in the practice of law -- I hear that argument

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all the time; but until the court orders you to do it, you
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    don't start doing what needs to be done. So it's -- let me go
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    ahead and turn to defense counsel because I think -- how long
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    do you think it would take to respond?
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             MR. JONES: I'd suggest 45 days, Your Honor, because
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    that will get the objections to the production. And, frankly,
 7
    there are no deponents identified in discovery. It just says
 8
    seeks to take deponents whose names come up from the
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    production.
10
             THE COURT: Right.
             MR. JONES: So I think 45 days would be -- would be
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12
    satisfactory. It's still going to be demanding.
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             THE COURT: Are you saying 45 days to --
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             MR. JONES: From today.
15
             THE COURT: -- to produce the documents and provide
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    written responses, or are you saying to complete all the
17
    discovery?
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             MR. JONES: Well, I was thinking in terms of a
19
    discovery deadline. We would respond in 30 days under the
20
    rules.
21
             THE COURT: To the written discovery.
22
             MR. JONES: Yes. Yes.
23
             THE COURT: Okay.
             MR. JONES: And we'll respond earlier if we can.
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    want to move this along. And our responses may be staggered if
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we can respond to certain things first while we're doing other
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 2
    work. So I think 45 days to complete fact discovery.
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             THE COURT: Okay.
             MR. JONES: Now, I would ask the court -- I assume
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 5
    that your ruling would also authorize discovery by the
 6
    defendants within the same parameters.
 7
             THE COURT: Yes.
             MS. LOWRY: Your Honor, does that mean also to
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9
    complete the depositions?
             THE COURT: That's what he's saying and I think that's
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    unrealistic.
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12
             MR. JONES: I really wasn't thinking that. I was
13
    thinking -- I'm sorry, Ms. Lowry. I was thinking to get all
14
    the documents and interrogatory answers to you. So maybe 45
15
    days to complete the written discovery.
16
             THE COURT: Okay.
17
             MR. JONES: Yes.
18
             THE COURT: And if I misunderstood -- obviously, I did
19
    misunderstand you. So I apologize.
20
             MR. JONES: There would be no Thanksgiving or
21
    Christmas if we do it in 45 days.
22
             THE COURT: Okay.
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             MS. LOWRY: But, Your Honor, that does seem excessive
    and we would ask --
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             THE COURT: You mean aggressive.
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MS. LOWRY: I'm sorry, sir?
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             THE COURT: You said "excessive."
             MS. LOWRY: Excessive. I said excessive, yes.
 3
 4
             THE COURT: What's excessive?
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             MS. LOWRY: The 45 days to complete the written
 6
    responses --
 7
             THE COURT: Okav.
 8
             MS. LOWRY: -- because we would like to start taking
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    the depositions as soon as we can, and we would like to be able
    to complete the whole discovery period as soon as we can. And
10
    we are prepared to do the depositions as soon as people get
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12
    identified. And there are some that we can think will be
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    identified more quickly. I mean, obviously, Commissioner
    Dickinson is somebody who's going to be deposed. But we do
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15
    need the written responses in order to depose them.
16
             THE COURT: Yeah. I was thinking 45 days is awfully
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    aggressive to try to get it all done. And, Mr. Jones, you
    did -- after I asked my question, you said, well, no, you were
18
19
    thinking that you would get the responses done in the customary
20
    30 days.
21
             MR. JONES: And have all of the documents produced
22
    within 45 days. That's really what I was --
23
             THE COURT: Okay. I understand.
             MR. JONES: I thought that's what you were asking.
24
             THE COURT: I will allow that. Let's do that, that
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you'd have written responses within 30 days, document
 1
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    production would be completed within 45.
 3
             And then how long do you think you need to take
 4
    depositions, Ms. Lowry?
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             MS. LOWRY: We can do it in two weeks, Your Honor, all
 6
    the depositions.
 7
             THE COURT: Okav.
 8
             MR. JONES: Can we, Your Honor, come back -- we've
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    always been impressed with the ability of this court to guide
    the parties in litigation. Could we come back at the 45-day
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    point and we will know how many depositions they're requesting?
11
             This agency is undergoing multiple federal and state
12
13
    reviews constantly; and the staff is limited, particularly at
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    the very top. And at the 45-day point or maybe at any -- some
15
    point close to that, I'd suggest we confer with you and
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    determine how long do we need for depositions.
17
             If they're going to take -- they've asked for, I don't
    know -- well, they haven't asked for a number; but if it's five
18
19
    depositions of senior people after the 45 days, that's not
20
    going to be an easy thing to do during the
21
    Christmas-Thanksgiving season and -- and with the schedule of
22
    our executives. But it may -- if it's one person or two
23
    people, maybe it's workable. So I'd suggest reserving that
    time period.
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THE COURT: I hate to say this, but I anticipate that

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we're going to be on the phone at some point on some discovery issues on this. What I'd prefer to do is set a deadline. And there will be the language in this order that is the same language that's in my case management order, that if you have any disputes, then you can bring those to me, but you have to do it before you can file a motion. And I have a feeling that we'll have at least one telephone conference.

I would prefer to set a deadline for everyone to do things. For example, if I set a date for us to get on the phone, that's going to delay things even more. I would prefer to go ahead and put the burden on plaintiffs' counsel and a deadline that would require them to go ahead and send out their notices of depositions. And then we'll know exactly what we're dealing with when we get on the phone and they will have identified by notice who it is that they want to depose and then we can deal with it and it will be faster, because if we can't get it worked out, then everybody knows what motions they need to file. And after the conference we can get to the motion filing stage instead of maybe having more than one conference on that.

So the order of the court is going to be that all discovery must be completed by -- and I'm going to count 60 days from today, whatever that is, and I'm going to give that deadline. And we will identify that defendants must respond -- serve responses to this discovery 30 days from today and all

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responsive documents that they intend to produce be produced 45
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    days from today.
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             MR. JONES: This is fact discovery, Your Honor?
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             THE COURT: I don't really -- I'm --
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             MR. JONES: As opposed to --
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             THE COURT: Why are you -- instead of expert
 7
    discovery?
 8
             MR. JONES: Yes, sir. I think the expert discovery --
9
    expert opinions, if there are any, are going to be derived from
    the --
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             THE COURT: Nobody's brought up the expert issue yet.
11
    Are there going to be experts, and if so -- I mean, I know that
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13
    your discovery already requests information about experts.
14
             MS. LOWRY: Yes, it does.
15
             THE COURT:
                        Okay. I didn't want to get into this.
16
    mean, now you have me -- you have my brain going down a totally
17
    different course.
18
             MR. JONES: It's not --
19
             THE COURT: -- which is an expert designation
20
    deadline. Let me finish. And then make sure you're speaking
21
    into the mic and let's make sure we're only talking one at a
22
    time.
23
             I'm going to enter the order -- I'm only going to deal
    with the issues that are pending before the court. And if
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25
    there need to be other issues that need to be addressed, you're
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going to need to file a motion. I don't have any of those issues in front of me right now. I have the plaintiffs' motions for discovery. I'm granting it. I'm going to put in the order what I have indicated, and that will be the order of the court.

If we need to address some other issues, we'll address them on another day; but I'm only going to decide what's pending before me right now.

I will also -- I think that we need to -- I hate that I say things like this sometimes, but I try to be a realist. I have a feeling that some things may end up getting moved; but I also want us to put in place a structure that if we need to move things, we -- everybody knows what we're dealing with. So my order is also going to include that the plaintiffs' supplemental response to the defendants' motion must be filed by, and it's going to be 30 days from the discovery deadline. All right.

And then I'm also going to put in there that the defendants' rebuttal in support of their motion must be filed by, and it will be 30 days from the deadline for plaintiffs' supplemental response. And if we have other discovery issues or you face any additional discovery issues, call my chambers and we'll deal with them. Okay.

Anything else from the plaintiff?

MR. JONES: No, Your Honor.

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MS. LOWRY: Nothing, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: All right. Anything further from the
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    defendants?
             MR. JONES: No, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: All right. That will be the order of the
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    court. Thank you.
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         (HEARING CONCLUDED)
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CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

I, MARY VIRGINIA "Gina" MORRIS, Official Court
Reporter, United States District Court, Southern District of
Mississippi, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing
pages contain a full, true and correct transcript of the
proceedings had in the aforenamed case at the time and
place indicated, which proceedings were recorded by me to
the best of my skill and ability.

I certify that the transcript fees and format comply with those prescribed by the Court and Judicial Conference of the United States.

This the 27th day of August, 2018.

s/ Gina Morris
U.S. DISTRICT COURT REPORTER